This paper develops a theory of optimal interval division for capacity-constrained problems in which a continuum is divided into finitely many intervals, or classes, and choices are class-targeted. Examples include the location of public facilities by a social planner, the distribution of product characteristics by firms, coarse matching, bounded memory, and mechanism design with limited communication.
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In this paper, I develop a theory of optimal interval division for capacity-constrained problems. In my framework, the value of each finite interval partition of a given continuum is derived by summation from a basic primitive that I call a cell function defined over all the subintervals. Optimal interval division refers to the problem of finding the interval partition maximizing the associated value, constrained by the number of classes (i.e. partition elements).
For instance, in the Hotelling story, suppose that the mayor distributes the merchants to minimize the aggregate transportation cost. I recast the mayor's problem as an optimal interval division problem. For each line segment, I ask what is the negative minimum total transportation cost for its residents for one merchant to serve them. This gives the cell function. The value of each finite interval division of Hotelling City is a sum of the cell function over the partition elements.
2 We optimally choose the interval partition where the allowed number of partition elements is the number of the merchants. This determines an optimal division of Hotelling City. Finally, the merchants are located optimally in each segment. I identify an important and common property on cell functions: they are submodular over the interval structure. Submodularity first implies that dividing an interval into two subinterval is always profitable: the sum of the two subinterval values weakly exceeds that of the interval. Submodularity further asserts that the marginal gain to dividing an interval decreases as the interval shrinks.
Submodularity allows me to explore two fundamental questions for optimal interval division. First, how does the maximum value change with the number of classes? I show that if the cell function is submodular, then the maximum value exhibits decreasing marginal returns in the number of classes. This result applies to a large class of economic situations and subsumes a few existing results as special cases.
3 For a different thrust, I provide a simple sufficient condition on cell functions under which the maximum value converges rapidly, more precisely, converges as the inverse square of the number of classes. The convergence result addresses the question posed by Rogerson (2003) for costly procurement.
4
The second basic question is how do optimal cut-offs change with the number of classes? I uncover a novel sandwiching property: when allowing an extra class, the new optimal cutoffs are more spread compared with the original optimal ones in the sense that each new cut point lands in a different original partition element. This helps elucidate the effect of capacity constraints on economic behavior, or the welfare consequences of relaxing capacity constraints. For instance, in the Hotelling story, the sandwiching property implies that residents in extreme locations always benefit from more merchants, since they pay lower transportation costs. For residents with non-extreme locations, the welfare effect of more merchants is indeterminate.
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Finally, by a characterization theorem, I show that a submodular optimal interval division problem can often be interpreted as a Hotelling story with a general transportation cost function, despite arising from seemingly unrelated contexts like coarse matching.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I briefly review the existing literature. In Section 2, I introduce the model. Some important classes of cell functions are discussed. In Section 3, I introduce and interpret the notion of submodularity. Sufficient 3 As an easy corollary, the "greedy algorithm" (Fox, 1966) is commonly valid for the optimal assignment among multiple projects, e.g., assigning a fixed number of merchants among multiple linear cities. 4 Comparing Wilson (1989) and McAfee (2002) , Rogerson (2003) says: "the mathematical structure of these models is somewhat different than the mathematical structure of the contracting models, so the results do not transfer immediately. However, it seems possible that there is a more general result lurking underneath all of these results."
5 For an example of the effects of capacity constraints on economic behavior, assume the continuum as a space of signal realizations of the net return of some risky asset. In this case the partition structure captures what is later recalled (Dow, 1991) . Each interval partition is a different possible memory scheme. Now assume that in period one, a small investor chooses a memory scheme with a given partition size. In period two, he sees the realized partition element and then decides how much to invest in the risky asset. I pose a behavioral question: How does memory capacity affect the investment behavior? conditions for submodularity are provided for the important classes. Section 4 is the main part of the paper. In Section 4.1, I discuss the properties of decreasing marginal returns and quadratic convergence rate. In Section 4.2, I discuss the sandwiching property for optimal cut-offs. In Section 4.3, I briefly discuss the structure of cell functions. In Section 5, as an application of the sandwiching property, I inspect the effects of memory capacity on portfolio choice. I summarize the results in Section 6.
Related Literature. A notion of submodular set functions is involved in discrete resource allocations and some known combinatorial optimization problems (Moulin, 1988; Gul and Stacchetti, 1999; Chade and Smith, 2006; Lehmann et al., 2006) . The interpretation of submodularity within our context differs from the traditional one for utilities over commodity bundles. More importantly, the basic questions and mathematical structures involved in the division problem are very different from those in resource allocation.
Cell functions relate closely to the notion of capacity in measure theory (Choquet, 1954) . The latter is widely involved in the economics of ambiguity (Schmeidler, 1989; Marinacci and Montrucchio, 2004; Lehrer and Teper, 2008) . Cell functions capture exactly what we need to know to find the optimal interval division, while capacity within this context contains redundant information.
6 In addition, for cell functions, submodularity and other properties are much easier to obtain. In many cases, simple calculus reveals much about cell functions. This is not true for capacity. The theory of optimal interval division developed here appiles to the following specific problems: scalar quantization in information theory (Oliver et al., 1948; Lloyd, 1982; Max, 1960) , coarse matching (Wilson, 1989; McAfee, 2002; Shao, 2011) , bounded memory (Dow, 1991) , and mechanism design with limited communication (Rogerson, 2003; Chu and Sappington, 2007; Bergemann et al., 2012; Wong, 2014) .
In information theory and quantization, Oliver, Pierce, and Shannon (1948) among others show that the average distortion with the squared error measure by using a uniform quantizer and n classes tends to 0 asymptotically at an order of 1/n 2 . 7 Wilson (1989) , Shao (2011), and Wong (2014) within various specific economic contexts rediscover similar results. Dow (1991) first observes decreasing marginal returns in a numerical example, 6 The domain of capacity is commonly required to be a σ-algebra or an algebra or minimally, closed under the operations of union and intersection. In contrast, the domain of cell functions, i.e. the collection of all closed subintervals, is not closed even under the operation of union.
7 The most important nonasymptotic results are the basic optimality conditions and iterative-descent algorithms for quantizer design, discussed by Lloyd (1982) and Max (1960) among others. See Gray and Neuhoff (1998) for an excellent review. but suspects its generality. Within the context of nonlinear pricing, Wong (2014) first shows that the monopolist's value exhibits decreasing marginal returns. McAfee (2002) , Rogerson (2003) and Chu and Sappington (2007) among others show that the gain from very coarse schemes (two classes) may be large. The large gain from very coarse schemes relies on highly special closed-form assumptions.
It is interesting to note that Crawford and Sobel (1982) contains a sandwiching property for equilibrium cut-offs in their model. There it is a direct consequence of their monotone conditions on equilibrium equations (their M and M conditions). In contrast, the sandwiching property here arises as a basic feature from maximizing a coarse value with submodular cell functions.
Finally, in the context of observational learning, Smith, Sørensen, and Tian (2012) discuss how optimal cut-offs change with respect to prior beliefs and show that their objective function is supermodular in belief cut-offs. Their observation relies crucially on linear utilities. More importantly, their objective function is not the coarse value discussed here, since the partition size there has to be fixed.
The Model and Some Examples
Let P = {[a, b] : 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1} be the collection of all the closed subintervals of [0, 1] , with a generic element denoted by I. We refer to each element in P as a cell. Let
partitions the interval [0, 1] into n + 1 (perhaps trivial) cells. To simplify expression, put x 0 = 0 and x n+1 = 1. A coarse value V maps ∪ n≥0 X n toR so that there is a cell function v with
∀ n ≥ 0 and x ∈ X n ; V is an upper coarse value if the summation in (1) begins at k = 1.
I now discuss two important classes of cell functions induced by decision problems and matching problems respectively. The latter is attributed to McAfee (2002) .
Decision Problems. A decision problem is defined as a collection
where F a distribution function over [0, 1] and for each t, u(θ, t) is in L 1 (dF ). The decision problem is atomless if F is atomless. A cell function v is induced by an atomless decision problem {u(θ, t)dF } t∈T , if for each cell I, we have
In (2), we may view T as a set of actions. For each t among T , u(θ, t) is the utility from action t, depending on the type θ. The value v(I) arises from choosing an action t among T so as to maximize the total utility over I weighted by F . The Hotelling story discussed before is a special case of (2). Two additional examples are provided as below.
Example 1 (Bounded Memory). In Dow (1991)'s story of bounded memory, a consumer observes the price of an item from the first seller (θ ∈ [0, 1]) in period 1, but is able to recall it only among finitely many partition intervals in period 2, when he observes the price offered by the second seller (p ∈ [0, 1]). In period 2 and based on his memory of the price offered by the first seller, the consumer decides whether to buy the item from the second seller or return to the first seller. In period 1 and before his observation of the price offered by the first seller, the consumer decides how to efficiently use his limited memory bits so as to minimize his expected payment of the item. Let F be the distribution function of the possible prices offered by the first seller and G, the one of the prices offered by the second seller and assume that they are independent. The negative expected payment for each memory scheme x in X n is given by
where
Note that W in (4) is convex. Thus by convex duality, we can rewrite (3) into
where {θt + y(t)} t∈T is the collection of supporting lines of W . It is a coarse value with (2) as its the cell function where u(θ, t) is linear in θ for each t.
Example 2 (Mechanism Design with Limited Communication). In Bergemann et al. (2012) and Wong (2014) , a continuum of types (θ in [0, 1] ) with the distribution function F is divided into finitely many classes, and the qualities of some service are class-targeted. The utility function for each type θ is given by w(θ, t) + p where t ∈ [0, 1] is the quality of the service at the choice of social planner, and p the transfer the agent receives. Assume that w is supermodular with w(θ, 0) = 0. Let c(t) with c(0) = 0 be the social cost incurred by providing the service at the quality of t. Suppose that the social planner only affords to provide at most n different qualities. The maximal surplus is achieved by maximizing the upper coarse value among X n with (2) as its cell function where u(θ, t) = w(θ, t) − c(t).
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Coarse Matching. Now I turn to coarse matching (Wilson, 1989; McAfee, 2002 
where the notation m(·) denotes the Lebesgue measure.
3 Cell Division and Submodularity
Submodularity
In this subsection, I introduce an important property on the effects of division of cells.
Definition 2. A cell function v is submodular if for each cell I 1 and I 2 with I 1 ∩ I 2 = ∅,
8 The maximal surplus is not achieved by maximizing the coarse value among X n−1 with (2) as its cell function where u(θ, t) = w(θ, t) − c(t). Because the surplus from the extremely lower types is negative, by precluding them from service (the planner can do this by pricing properly), social welfare increases. The surplus loss by using coarse value instead of upper coarse value could be large when n is small. 
In (7), the marginal value of the cut-off c in dividing a cell I into two cells decreases as the cell I shrinks. For instance, in the example of location of merchants, the larger the segment is, the larger the transportation cost saved by introducing an additional merchant. Observation 1 adapts to our context a related equivalence relation in combinatorial optimization (Lovasz, 1982) . The interpretation of submodularity within our context is different from the traditional one for utilities over commodity bundles (Moulin, 1988; Gul and Stacchetti, 1999) . Next, I turn to some notions in lattice analysis. Let (R n , ≥) be the n-dimensional Euclidean space and "∨" and "∧" the join and meet operators over (R n , ≥). 10 Following Topkis (1978) or Milgrom and Shannon (1994) , a subset B ⊆ R n is a sublattice (of R n ) if
for each x and x in B, we have both x ∧ x ∈ B and x ∨ x ∈ B. Note that each X n as previously defined is a sublattice of R n . A function f over B is supermodular over B, if for each x and x in B, we have f (
; f is strictly supermodular if the inequality is strict for each non-ordered pair (x, x ).
Observation 2. A cell function is submodular if and only if it is supermodular over X 2 where each (
In Observation 2, the reduction of cells to points in X 2 provides substantial analytic convenience. For example, calculus can be used. We say that an (upper) coarse value is supermodular if it is supermodular over X n for each n ≥ 1.
9 The related notions for set functions in resource allocation are as follows. Let Ω be a finite set of items, and 2 Ω the power set of Ω, that is, the collection of all the possible bundles. A decision maker has a utility function u over 2 Ω . We say that u is submodular, if u(
Ω and c ∈ B. The property of decreasing marginal returns here refers to that the marginal utility by adding a new item to the bundle B increases as B shrinks. The classic equivalence relation states that u is submodular if and only if it exhibits decreasing marginal returns.
10 For two points x and
Observation 3. An (upper) coarse value is real-valued and supermodular if and only if its cell function is real-valued and submodular.
Sufficient Conditions for Submodularity
In this subsection, I show that with quite standard conditions, the cell functions for the important classes are submodular.
Proposition 1 (Decision Problem). The cell function induced by a WSC ordered and atomless decision problem is submodular.
Proof. Let {dµ t = u(θ, t)dF } t∈T be a WSC ordered atomless decision problem. Fix two cells I 1 and I 2 with I 1 ∩ I 2 = ∅. I show that for each t and t in T , we have
First consider the case µ t (I 1 ∩ I 2 ) ≤ µ t (I 1 ∩ I 2 ). We have
Thus (8) holds. Next, consider the case µ t (I 1 ∩ I 2 ) > µ t (I 1 ∩ I 2 ). By the weakly single crossing condition, we have either
. Without loss of generality, consider the first case. We have
Thus (8) holds. Since t and t in (8) are arbitrary, sup t∈T µ t (I) is submodular.
Q.E.D. Hopenhayn and Presscott (1992) shows that the supremum over some dimensions of a supermodular multi-dimensional function remains supermodular over the remaining dimensions. Proposition 1 is not implied by their observation.
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Lemma 1 (Matching). Suppose that u in (5) is supermodular. Then v m is submodular.
The single crossing condition involved in Proposition 1 is satisfied for most common decision problems (Lehman, 1988; Milgrom and Shannon, 1994; Persico, 2000; Athey, 2002) . The condition of supermodularity for matching is standard in the matching literature (Becker, 1973) . Thus, cell functions are commonly submodular.
General Properties
This section is the main part of the paper. It provides answers to the two basic questions mentioned in the introduction. Also, the structure of cell functions is discussed with a characterization theorem.
Value
Given a coarse value V , for each n, let V n = sup x∈X n V (x) be the supremum of the values by using at most n + 1 classes. We say that a coarse value V exhibits decreasing marginal returns if for each n ≥ 1, V n+1 + V n−1 ≤ 2V n holds. We have the following general observation.
Theorem 1 (DMR).
A supermodular coarse value exhibits decreasing marginal returns.
The intuition for Theorem 1 is clear from the preceding discussion of the submodular effect of cell division, i.e., Observation 1 and Observation 3. Theorem 1 implies a large class of coarse values obeying decreasing marginal returns, including single crossing ordered decision problems by Proposition 1, coarse matching with supermodular primitive by Lemma 1, and the class of decision problems involved in Theorem 4 in Section 4.3.
12 Figure 1 shows that decreasing marginal returns may fail for non-supermodular cases.
11 Suppose that T is a subinterval of the reals. The integral x2 x1 u(θ, t)dF as a function of (x 1 , x 2 , t) is not supermodular over X 2 × T except the trivial case that all the actions are essentially the same. To see it, first consider the non-ordered pair (x 1 , x 2 , t ) and (x 1 , x 2 , t) with x 2 > x 2 and t > t. Supermodularity requires
u(θ, t)dF . Next, consider the non-ordered pair (x 1 , x 2 , t) and (x 1 , x 2 , t ) with x 1 > x 1 and t > t, supermodularity requires
u(θ, t)dF . This implies that for each 
and decreasing marginal returns are restored, despite a knife-edge case. This is because the set of actions T = {1, 2, 3} is weakly single crossing ordered and the induced cell function now is submodular.
Proof of Theorem 1: Given x in X n+1 and x in X n−1 , let x = (0, x , 1) in X n+1 . We have
The first inequality in (9) follows from the supermodularity assumption. The second inequality in (9) holds since the last dimension of x ∨ x equals 1 and the first dimension of x ∧ x equals 0, hence both x ∨ x and x ∧ x are equivalent to some elements in X n .
Since x and x are arbitrary, the desired result follows.
Q.E.D.
u(θ, t)dF and thus u(·, t) = u(·, t ) a.e. in F . 12 Within the context of nonlinear pricing, Wong (2014) shows that the monopolist's value exhibits decreasing marginal return. Wong (2014)'s observation is a special case of the single crossing ordered decision problems. Remark 1. Theorem 1 extends easily to upper coarse values plus a weak monotone con-
The statement is omitted.
Next, I turn to the problem of convergence. Let V be a coarse value with v as its cell function. Assume that v as a function over X 2 is second-order cross differentiable and that v 12 is integrable. If the cell function v is supermodular over X 2 , then we have v 12 ≥ 0.
The following observation says that the cross derivative function v 12 precisely captures the potential gains in the involved division problem. Let
Lemma 2. Suppose that v 12 ≥ 0. Then we have
for each n ≥ 1 and x in X n , and thus
Proof. It is easy to verify directly that (10) holds, which gives (11) by v 12 ≥ 0. Q.E.D. Figure 2 illustrates the above observation. For each x in X n , the difference
is simply the summation of the areas of the n + 1 small triangles with v 12 as the density function (see Figure 2) . We say that a function f over X 2 is α-Lipschitz continuous, if
Theorem 2. Suppose that v 12 ≥ 0 and is α-Lipschitz continuous. Then there exists some
Theorem 2 provides a simple unified perspective on the inverse-square convergence rate (see Appendix B for discussion).
Proof of Theorem 2: Let v be α-Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant M . For each n, let x(n) = (1/(n + 1), . . . , k/(n + 1), . . . , n/(n + 1)). By (10) and (11) in Lemma 2, we have
The desired result then follows from the observation that for each k,
Cut-offs
Two points x in X n and x in X n+1 are sandwiched if for each k, we have
For instance, in the sequence of uniform cut-offs {(1/(n+1), . . . , n/(n+1))} n∈N , the cut-offs for each n and n + 1 are sandwiched. We say that x and x are weakly sandwiched if both inequalities in (12) are replaced by "≤". Proposition 2 below implies that the weak sandwiching property holds commonly for extreme optimal cut-offs, based on Observation 3, and the fact that cell functions are commonly submodular. For each n, let X * (n) = arg max x∈X n V (x), where the coarse value V involved is clear by the context. Proposition 2 (A Weak Sandwiching Property). Let V be real-valued, continuous, and supermodular. Then for each n ≥ 1, the greatest (least) element in X * (n) and the greatest (least) element in X * (n + 1) are weakly sandwiched.
Before addressing the sandwiching property, I shall now pause to discuss some regular properties of cell functions. For each cell I, let X Theorem 3 (A Sandwiching Property). Let V admit a regular cell function. Then each x in X * (n) and x in X * (n + 1) are sandwiched for each n ≥ 1.
Crawford and Sobel (1982) derive a sandwiching property for equilibrium cut-offs (their Lemma 3), which is a consequence of their monotone assumptions on equilibrium equations (their M and M conditions).
14 In contrast, the sandwiching property here arises as a basic feature from maximizing supermodular coarse values. The example below illustrates the difference between optimal division and equilibrium analysis. ford and Sobel (1982) where the sender and the receiver share the same preference (Lipman, 2009; Gerhard Jager and Riedel, 2011) . Player 1 observes the state θ, a random draw from [0, 1] according to a continuous and positive density function f . He then chooses a message m from a set M with |M | = n + 1. Player 2 observes this message but not θ and then chooses an action t from T . Assume that the messages themselves are costless. Both agents have the same utility function u(θ, t) which is twice continuously differentiable with u 22 < 0 and u 12 > 0. The set of efficient cut-offs corresponds to arg max x∈X n V (x) and V is 14 To the best of my knowledge, the most general conditions for this kind of monotonicity, given by Szalay (2012) , require roughly smooth location forms of the utilities and log-concave densities. the coarse value with (2) as its cell function where F admits the density function f . By Lemma 9 in Appendix 9 and Theorem 3, the efficient cut-offs are sandwiched with partition sizes. The set of equilibrium cut-offs are the ones satisfying the indifference condition:
Example 3 (Efficient Language vs Equilibrium Language). Consider a version of Craw
For equilibrium cut-offs to be sandwiched, we need the M and M properties in Crawford and Sobel (1982) .
Characterizing Submodular Cell Functions
In this subsection, I discuss briefly the structure of cell functions. Specifically, I show that submodular cell functions can often be induced by decision problems. This is based on a tight relation between cell functions and the notion of capacity in measure theory. The latter is first discussed by Choquet (1954) . First, I introduce some common properties of cell functions. A cell function is monotone if for each cell I 1 and I 2 with I 1 ⊂ I 2 , v(I 1 ) ≤ v(I 2 ). In (2), if u(θ, t) ≥ 0, then the induced cell function is monotone. Let X 2 be endowed with the city block metric ρ, i.e., ρ(x, x ) = |x 1 − x 1 | + |x 2 − x 2 | for each x and x in X. 15 A cell function v is continuous if it is continuous over (X 2 , ρ); v is Lipschitz continuous if there exits some M > 0 such that for each x and x in X 2 , we have |v(x) − v(x )| ≤ M ρ(x, x ).
Next, I adapt to our context the notion of weakly filtering which is involved in the characterization of submodular capacity (Anger, 1977) . Let Q be a subset of P.
Definition 3 (Weakly Filtering).
A decision problem {dµ t = u(θ, t)dF } t∈T is weakly filtering on Q, if for each cell I and I in Q with I ⊆ I , we have both sup t∈T µ t (I) = µ t (I) and sup t∈T µ t (I ) = µ t (I ) for some t in T .
A subset Q of P is dense in P, if for each cell I in P and open set O with I ⊆ O, there exists a cell I in Q with I ⊆ I ⊆ O. The main result in this section is stated below.
Theorem 4 (Characterization). Let v be a real-valued cell function. Then 1. v is submodular, continuous and monotone if and only if it can be induced by some atomless decision problem {dµ n = u(θ, n)dF } n∈N weakly filtering on a dense subset of P such that u(θ, n) ≥ 0 and sup
) is finite and continuous over X 2 ;
2. v is submodular and Lipschitz continuous if and only if it can be induced by some decision problem {u(θ, n)dm} n∈N weakly filtering on a dense subset of P such that sup n∈N |u(θ, n)| < M < ∞.
The following result applies Theorem 4 to coarse matching in McAfee (2002) . 
Proof of Theorem 4
Let K be the collection of all the compact subsets of [0, 1], and R + = {z ∈ R : z ≥ 0}. Following Anger (1977) or Adamski (1977) , a capacity c maps K to R + such that 1) c(∅) = 0, and 2) c(K) ≤ c(K ) if K ⊂ K , and 3) for each K in K and each > 0,
A capacity c is submodular if for each A and B in K, we have
. Submodular capacity is the focus in many analyses (Choquet, 1954) . A cell function v admits submodular capacity extension if there exists a submodular capacity c such that v and c coincide at each cell.
Lemma 3 (Cell Function and Capacity). A cell function admits atomless submodular capacity extension if and only if it is continuous, submodular and monotone.
A measure µ is dominated by a capacity c, if for each K ∈ K, we have µ(K) ≤ c(K). Given a capacity c, let U(c) be the collection of all the positive measures dominated by c. The next result, due to Anger (1977) and Adamski (1977) among others, says that a submodular capacity is upper envelopes of the positive measures dominated by it.
Lemma 4 (Anger (1977) ; Adamski (1977) ). Let c be a submodular capacity. Then c(K) = max µ∈U(c)
Proof of the only if part of (1) 
Since is arbitrary, (14) implies (13). The desired result then follows from (13), the continuity of v, and the fact that each µ n is absolutely continuous with respect to
Q.E.D.
The notion of cell functions is perfectly suited for optimal interval division in the sense that it captures exactly what we need to know about the problem to find the optimal interval division. In contrast, capacity within this context contains redundant information. Furthermore, for cell functions, submodularity or other properties are much easier to obtain. In many cases, simple calculus reveals lots about cell functions -this is not true for capacity.
Memory and Investment: an Example
In this section, as an application of the sandwiching property, I discuss the effect of memory capacity on investment behavior in a simple model of portfolio choice.
16 Specifically, I show that for risk averse investors, one with worse memory is less likely to buy a risky asset for which the expected net return is priorly small. The underlying logic is that an investor with less memory capacity is less responsive to good news of the asset and thus less likely to buy it. This result is intuitive, but it does not follow from any known analysis.
Consider a scenario where a small investor decides whether to buy a divisible risky asset conditional on his private information. At period 0, he holds some prior belief of the asset's net return r ∈ R, where R = [r 1 , r 2 ] with r 1 < 0 < r 2 . At period 1, he observes privately a signal realization s ∈ S = [0, 1] of the net return. Let h(s, r) over [0, 1] × R be the density kernel over S conditional on each r in R. In the analysis below, I assume that h is continuous, positive, and strictly logsupermodular, which is quite standard.
At period 2, based on his memory of the signal realization, the investor chooses a holding level z from the interval [0,z] (z > 0). In the spirit of Dow (1991) , I shall assume that the investor at period 2 can only recall n + 1 partition events. At period 0, he decides how to efficiently use his memory bits.
Let (Λ, ||·||) be the space of all the continuous positive density functions over R endowed with the supremum norm. In addition, let Λ 0 = {f ∈ Λ : R rf (r)dr = 0}. Taking each f in Λ as the investor's prior belief, the posterior density function over r conditional on each signal realization s is given by
We denote by
the ideal non-holding area of the signals, i.e., the signals for which the conditional expected net return is non-positive. 16 Traditional theory predicts that an investor with a smooth Bernoulli utility function will hold a risky asset at positive levels if and only if it has positive expected net return. That is, the effect of risk aversion on the holding of risky assets is of second order significance. The known ways to generate a first order effect are to introduce transaction costs or "kinks" of utility functions (Campbell, 2011) .
17 Actually, bounded memory and thus discrete choice affords another natural explanation of non-participation in risky markets, which is overlooked largely by the former literature.
Fix w > 0 as the investor's initial wealth.
18 Let U be the collection of all the twice continuously differentiable utility functions defined over [w −zr 1 , w +zr 2 ] such that for each u in U, we have u > 0 and u < 0. That is, U is the collection of utilities with smooth risk aversion defined over the support of the possible realized wealth. Taking each u in U as the investor's Bernoulli utility function over the wealth, and each f in Λ as the investor's prior belief of the net return, the expected utility conditional on s and with holding z in [0,z] is then given bŷ
Now I turn to optimal memory schemes. The functionû f (s, z) is single crossing ordered
As a result, we may focus on interval partitions. Then the investor's problem reduces to maximizing a coarse value V (x|f, u) over X n with the cell
where g f (s) = R h(s, r)f (r)dr is the marginal density function of s.
Denote by x(n|f, u) an arbitrary selection of X * (n|f, u) and let S(n|f, u) be the non-holding area of the signals induced by x(n|f, u). That is, S(n|f, u) is the union of the cells generated by the cut-offs x(n|f, u) over which non-holding is optimal. We have the following observation.
Corollary 2 (Memory Capacity and Optimal Holding). For each u in U, there exists a neighborhood O of Λ 0 such that for each f in O, the sequence {S(n|f, u)} shrinks strictly over N with S * (f ) as its limit.
With priors close enough to Λ 0 , the expected net return of the asset is priorly small but possibly positive. A risk averse investor with bounded memory will hold such an asset at some positive level only when the posterior expected net return is positive and large enough, due to discrete choices. By Corollary 2, with more memory capacity, one is strictly more likely to buy such an asset at some positive level. This is an implication of the sandwiching property, as depicted by Figure 3 .
The analysis here also extends easily to the case w obeys a distribution independent of (r, s). 19 A trivial observation is that when n tends to infinity, {S(n|f, u)} shrinks asymptotically to S * (f ). This asymptotic observation is not that related to real life, since our human memory capacity is limited severely, bounded above by the magic number of 7, plus or minus two according to Miller (1956) . of l such that for each f in O l , we have that 1) the cell function v(I|f, u) is regular by Lemma 9 in Appendix 9, and 2) for each x in X * (1|f, u), z = 0 is strictly optimal for (16) with
The desired result then follows from Theorem 3. Q.E.D.
Conclusion
In this paper, I developed a theory of optimal interval division for the set of capacityconstrained problems. My companion paper applies some of the analysis here to language and mechanism design with limited communication (Tian, 2015) . This paper focuses on scalar cases. Whether and how the results here extend to multidimensional contexts are important and deserve further efforts.
. By the Envelope Theorem, we have
which is α-Lipschitz continuous. Thus by Theorem 2, the inverse-square convergence rate holds for decision problems with the conditions stated here. 20 Turning to matching (5), Shao (2011) generalizes Wilson (1989) and shows that if u in (5) is twice differentiable and u 12 ≥ 0 and is bounded, then the inverse-square convergence rate holds for coarse matching. One can verify that the condition in Shao (2011) implies that the cross derivative of v m is α-Lipschitz continuous, and thus is a special case of Theorem 2.
C Proof of Proposition 2
Lemma 5. Let V be a coarse value with regular cell function. Then for each x in X * (n) and x in X * (n + 1), we have
The rest is similar and omitted.
Proof of Proposition 2. Since V is continuous and supermodular and each X n is compact, each X * (n) is a nonempty compact sublattice of R n , by Corollary 2 in Milgrom and Shannon (1994) . Thus for each n ≥ 1, both the greatest element and the least element in X * (n) exist (e.g., Corollary 2.3.2 in Topkis (1998) ). Let x be the greatest element in X * (n), and x the greatest element in X * (n + 1). If x ≤ x −1 , we have x < (x 1 , x ∨ x −1 ), which contradicts that x is the greatest element in X * (n + 1), since (x 1 , x ∨ x −1 ) is in X * (n + 1) by Lemma 2. If x −(n+1) ≤ x, we have x < x ∨ x −(n+1) , which contradicts that x is the greatest element in X * (n), since x ∨ x −(n+1) is in X * (n) by Lemma 2. Thus
The case of the least element is similar and omitted. Q.E.D.
D Proof of Theorem 3
A subset of R n , say, Z, is strictly totally ordered, if for each y = z in Z, either y << z or z << y where the notation "z << y" means z k < y k for each k.
Lemma 6. Let V be a coarse value with regular cell function. Then ∀n ≥ 1, X * (n) is strictly totally ordered.
Proof.
Step 1. I first show that for each x ≤ x in X * (n), either x = x or x << x . By
Lemma 7 below and Corollary 2 in Milgrom and Segal (2002) , the FOC applies:
If x k = x k for some k between 1 and n, then we have x k+1 = x k+1 and x k−1 = x k−1 , by the condition that each v i increases strictly in x −i . Repeating this logic, we have x = x.
Step 1 implies either x ∨ x = x or x << x ∨ x . The former case implies x ≤ x and thus x << x by Step 1 and x = x . The latter case implies x << x . Q.E.D.
Lemma 7. Let V be a coarse value with a regular cell function v. Then for each x in X * (n) and k, x k is in the interior of supp(v) with x k = x j whenever k = j.
Proof. First, ∆v(c, I) > 0 for each non-degenerate I ⊆ supp(v) and c in the interior of I. As a result, for each x in X * (n), we have x k = x j for k = j among {0, 1, . . . , n, n + 1}. . Let x in X * (n) and
x in X * (n + 1). By Lemma 6 and (x ∧ x −(n+1) , x n+1 ) ∈ X * (n + 1) in Lemma 2, we have
Next, by the submodularity of v, we have v 1 (x n , c) ≤ v 1 (x n ±, 1). Then we have v 1 (x n , x n+1 ) < v 1 (x n ±, 1) by x n+1 < c in Lemma 7.
Step 1 in the proof of Lemma 6 then implies x −(n+1) << x. The argument for x << x −1 is similar and omitted. Thus
E Finishing the Proof of Theorem 4
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. (Necessity). Let v be a cell function and c its submodular capacity extension. By continuity of c from above, the cell function v(x 1 , x 2 ) over X 2 is left continuous at x 1 and right continuous at x 2 . To see that v is right continuous at x 1 , suppose x 1 < x 2 , and let {z n } be any sequence convergent to x 1 from above with each z n < x 2 . By submodularity and monotonicity of c, we have
Since h(z) = v(x 1 , z) as a function of z is right continuous at z = x 1 , we have lim I now show thatc is submodular over O. Let U 1 be the union of disjoint open intervals {(a n , b n )} n∈N 1 and U 2 the union of {(a n , b n )} n∈N 2 . Choose the index sets N 1 and N 2 such that N 1 ∩ N 2 = ∅. Denote U 1 ∪ U 2 as the union of disjoint open intervals {(c n , d n )} n∈N , and U 1 ∩ U 2 as the union of {(e n , f n )} n∈N 4 . We show
First, we can express each (c n , d n ) as
where 1) each n j ∈ N 1 ∪ N 2 and 2) if J n > 1, then b n j > a n j+1 for each j, and if n j ∈ N i , then n j+1 ∈ N −i for i = 1, 2. Let N 3 = ∪ n∈N {n 1 , . . . , n Jn }. Applying the general submodular inequalities in Choquet (1954) to (25) successively, we have
Summing (26) across n in N , we havẽ
Note that each (a n j+1 , b n j ) in the second summation on the left hand side of (27) equals some (e n , f n ). Next, for each (e n , f n ) that does not appear in the second summation on the left hand side of (27), we have (e n , f n ) = (a n , b n ) for some n in N 1 ∪ N 2 and n ∈ N 3 . This implies that (24) holds. (
Step 2). Define the function c over K by covering and using elements in O, that is,
The function c is well-defined because each compact set can be covered by some element in O. By the definition, c is monotone and continuous from above with c(∅) = 0 and thus a capacity. In addition, by Observation 4 and continuity of v, c coincides with v on the cells.
I now show that c is submodular over K. For each
Since U 1 and U 2 are arbitrary open covers of K 1 and K 2 respectively, we have
Finishing the Proof of Theorem 4
Proof of the If Part of (1) Proof. Let v satisfy the conditions in the above lemma with Lipschitz constant M , and {dµ n = u(θ, n)dµ} n∈N the decision problem inducing v in part (1) of Theorem 4. For each µ n , the fact that µ n (I) ≤ v(I) ≤ M m(I) for each cell I implies that µ n is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure m with dµ n /dm ≤ M . Q.E.D.
Proof of (2) in Theorem 4: The if part of (2) Then v in (2) is continuous and submodular with non-trivial convex support [b, c] . The existence of the directional derivative of v (0, z±) follows simply from the continuity of u and Theorem 3 in Milgrom and Segal (2002) . Theorem 1 in Milgrom and Segal (2002) implies the right size comparison. Next, for each cell I = [x 1 , x 2 ] with b ≤ x 1 < x 2 ≤ c, (2) also admits a unique interior solution, denoted by t * (x 1 , x 2 ), which is continuous in (x 1 , x 2 ) by the continuity of u 2 .
Since both u(θ, t)f (θ) and t * (x 1 , x 2 ) are continuous, the Envelope theorem applies, and so ∂v(x 1 , x 2 ) ∂x 2 = u(x 2 , t * (x 1 , x 2 ))f (x 2 ). Now I show that for each x 1 < x 1 < x 2 in [b, c],
by showing u(x 2 , t * (x 1 , x 2 )) > u(x 2 , t * (x 1 , x 2 )).
Suppose the contrary: u(x 2 , t * (x 1 , x 2 )) − u(x 2 , t * (x 1 , x 2 )) ≤ 0. First, we have t * (x 1 , x 2 ) > t * (x 1 , x 2 ), since u 2 is SSC in θ. Then the function u(θ, t * (x 1 , x 2 )) − u(θ, t * (x 1 , x 2 )) is SC in θ, since u is SC ordered and t * (x 1 , x 2 ) > t * (x 1 , x 2 ). Then since u(x 2 , t * (x 1 , x 2 )) − u(x 2 , t * (x 1 , x 2 )) ≤ 0, we have u(θ, t * (x 1 , x 2 )) − u(θ, t * (x 1 , x 2 )) ≤ 0 for each θ in [0, x 2 ).
This contradicts that t * (x 1 , x 2 ) solves (2) for I = [x 1 , x 2 ]. So (30) and thus (29) hold. The same also applies to v 1 (x 1 , x 2 ). The case of v m follows easily from (17) and (18) in the proof of Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
